Intergovernmental problems are increasingly dealt with in policy networks. This paper explores how network management helps to innovate intergovernmental relations. The innovative potential is studied by analysing different network management strategies, identifying network managers and their main attributes, and defining a number of management roles, using two case studies.
Covert action
The focus on the actual goals of network management in the two cases also shows that many strategies are deployed covertly. Network managers face a dilemma.
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They are expected to embody the collaborative spirit of the network and to manage in the interest of the network agenda as a whole (or at least to arrive at one to begin with). But to achieve success, some management activities required are manipulative, coercive, and rather sneaky (Huxham and Vangen 2005:66) .
There is a constant tension between manipulative behaviour which at times can be appropriate, versus the spirit of collaborative working. In the cases studied, actors for instance are activated and de-activated using coercive power (using political influence to order a governmental unit to leave or to join in). Some actors are not allowed full play by the network managers, other actors are kept out strategically.
Some actors are activated only to avoid negative power play of another actor.
Network managers in both cases strictly control the meeting agenda, not only in terms of process but also in terms of substance. As such, the management activities are only partially open and collaborative, part of it is not and remains backstage. To analyse this dark or covert side of network management, in-depth interviewing proves a crucial research method.
Managers and their attributes: what determines innovative capacity?
By studying management activities in a network, one can also discern who carries out such activities. As the focus is on intergovernmental networks, the particular interest is in the network management activities of public officials and the way those activities shape intergovernmental relations. This section focuses on the main managers, and a number of attributes that are typical for the intergovernmental network managers in the cases studied. These attributes seem to be conditions for innovation.
Managers: who is who?
Typically in networks, there is no single manager (Agranoff 2007 Klijn and Koppenjan 1997) . Management often is the result of these joined efforts. 'Joined' then does not necessarily mean that this is the result of deliberate or rationally inspired cooperation. It can also be the product of loosely coupled activities of managers acting individually at different levels and at different positions in the network.
In the cases studied, network management is the work of informal network teams joining local, provincial and Flemish governmental actors. Excepting the project coordinator in the first network (explicitly hired to manage the operational side of the network) and the consultants, in both networks the main network managers are self-appointed. Informal network teams (i.e. two 'network cores') set up the network in the early rounds, controlling (most of) network management throughout the process. The policy impact of the network management team is therefore substantial (but certainly not exclusive). As they lack an official or formal leadership or management position, their potential for network management is directly dependent on the degree of acceptance of their activities by the other actors.
These teams, whose members coordinate their strategies and play different roles (see below) produce intergovernmental cocktails. Some are mainly network champions ('the spiders in the intergovernmental web'); others take up a network promoting role, or provide creative input. The intergovernmental cocktails consist of ingredients derived from different governmental tiers, policy sectors, policy instruments, and are drawn from the political and administrative realm (including political parties). As such, a generic capacity to function in networks is required by all network managers, but they can have different specialized skills to do so.
In both case studies, administrative officials (e.g. project coordinator, the head of the provincial environmental administration, the provincial governor) are at the heart of the network management. Their actions represent the bulk of network management. Consultants (mainly in terms of know-how and expertise) and politicians (to ensure that political decisions are acquired) seem to take up a more supportive role. The central position of administrative officials however should be read with caution; this might be attributed to the fact that their actions are less covert than for instance those of politicians or private interests. So while the role 10/26 of administrative officials in network management is stressed here, the politicians should not be discarded or degraded to a secondary role.
The prominent position of administrative officials however can create conflicts with politicians that feel threatened in their position, and in their ability to present themselves. Some actors also feel that the main network managers sometimes deploy activities considered as political and unfit for civil servants.
Some politicians feel that such strategic planning processes take away their autonomy to make political deals. They call for the 'primacy of politics' to take ad hoc decisions as they see fit, without linking them to collaborative networks. Such politicians are very weary of engaging in long term and multi-actor policy processes, because it ties their hands to act ad hoc, to serve their clients; it hampers their freedom to wheal and deal, to make party political package deals.
While politicians with this ratio are found at all levels, it seems that this is a key feature at the level of the Flemish ministerial cabinets 7 -precisely where the main resources needed by both networks are situated.
Managerial attributes
The study of managerial behaviour reveals some basic attributes or personal skills which seem to be crucial for effective management of complex processes in IGRsettings. Those attributes are essential conditions for innovation. We organise our findings into three topics: passion and determination, skills and capacities, and finally (and maybe most importantly) the capability to act and behave in the grey zone of the boundaries between autonomous governmental units. 'Working at the boundaries' could be another definition of network management, and such boundary management is probably one of the most fertile soils for innovation.
7 In Belgium, federal and regional ministers have personal staff called 'cabinets' at their disposal. These cabinets consist of political staff members and policy experts regarding the ministers' competences (up to 50 people or more). Staff members are often associated with the same political party as the minister. Frequently, civil servants are attached to a cabinet for a period of office. On a smaller scale, such cabinets also exist in cities.
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Passion and determination
The ownership of the main intergovernmental boundary spanners 8 is linked to mission-driven endeavours (Agranoff 2005:19) . The network managers in both cases are genuinely convinced about the necessity and the way to achieve the network agenda. As such, their network management activities are not just a matter of professionalism, but also fuelled by personal beliefs. In the cases studied, they are (mainly) men with a mission. It also requires a high level of resilience, and patience: achieving both network agendas takes many years.
Interestingly, the passion and determination in both networks is also fuelled by the roots of the actors involved. Politicians in Flanders are known to have a special interest for their locality and serving local interest at the central level ('political localism'). However, civil servants at provincial and Flemish level are also driven by a local (in both cases 'Ghent') reflex, which might be labelled administrative localism. As such, network managers in an intergovernmental context can also be motivated by the ability to do something for 'their' locality.
Skills and capacities
Being passionate about the network and determined to achieve success is not sufficient; the right combination of skills and capacities is needed to create the required intergovernmental policy mix. Intergovernmental collaboration demands actors that can tolerate but also use high levels of complexity and uncertainty in function of the network agenda.
Intergovernmental network managers seem able to navigate through the pea-soup that the amalgamation of policies, interests, actors, relations, tiers, and contingencies is for an outsider (and for some insiders). As Thoenig (2005) 
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competition, but provides excellent opportunities for actors that can deal with such complexity.
They are not network super heroes with special powers, but they combine their institutional positions and a drive to achieve success with personal skills.
Paraphrasing one of the interviewees, these actors play in the intergovernmental champions' league. Weberian bureaucrats for instance are not able to play in that league. They are too dependent on features of a rational governing system, while networks demand the capacity to match rational and political views on policymaking. The challenge for network managers is to match long term perspectives with private interests and politicians who are often more concerned with immediate action and short term results.
For network managers, there is also an element what might be called 'the fun factor'. The network managers in both cases simply love dealing with high levels of complexity and uncertainty; they get a kick out of trying to accomplish successful intergovernmental coordination, and they consider the networks as a personal learning environment. So while network managers require a particular set of skills and capacities, they also learn by doing.
Scanning and spanning boundaries
To manage networks successfully, actors have to scan and span boundaries of governmental tiers, politics and administration, public and private sector, different policy sectors, … In this respect, the way network management is at the crossroads of politics and administration proves to be of particular interest in the cases studied.
In both cases studied, the administrative officials as key managers not just implement policies, they actively co-produce policy and strategies to achieve them, including strategies towards political actors and the use of party political channels. Instead of politicians setting out the strategic policy objectives and putting administrative officials to work to implement them, the praxis is even more the other way around. Administrative officials develop strategic policy objectives, 18/26
Network promoter (or 'tractor actor')
Somewhat diverging from Agranoff's (2003) definition, a 'network promoter' is defined here as an actor that is considered authoritative, accepted by all actors as a principal (in moral terms, not in terms of power or hierarchy) which leads the participating actors towards the common goals. He holds a position of trust and is also the one to which actors' direct grievances or concerns. He tries to keep things together at a general level and is the one that is expected to appease conflicts. If necessary, this actor might even 'sanction' network members (but again, based on a moral authority, based on trust and informal acceptance, granted to him by the stakeholders, rather than based on a hierarchic position). He is the active chair of the network, accepted by most/all actors as authoritative, perceived neutral, capable of keeping the process on route. In an intergovernmental network, he is also a go-between for local, provincial and Flemish government. As such, he promotes the network intergovernmentally.
While network champions create the necessary linkages between governmental tiers, sectors, and politics and administration, and network operators use this set to organise the networks' operations, the added value of the network promoter is to carry the weight of the network. The network promoter is able to overcome the different cultures and attitudes present in governmental and policy silos, and keep the representatives in a workable mode. He is able to capture the conflict between governmental actors, acting as a guardian of the intergovernmental catchment area or border region that any intergovernmental network presents. In this respect, he helps to innovate IGR by introducing a (new kind of) intergovernmental leadership respecting the equality of levels, mainly based on informal and personal characteristics.
In the PGK-case, the provincial governor lead the project and its operations without having much hierarchical power or formal competences to do so (although his institutional position puts him at the crossroads of local, provincial, and central government). He has a substantial moral weight, great moral authority. The governor is considered to lack a clearly identifiable interest and is therefore in a privileged position to do so. In the formal moments of the network, like meetings of the steering committee, he chairs meetings based on notes and support of the In the cases studied, vision keepers are actors that were mostly heavily involved in early rounds, but who switched positions or are no longer at the core of the network management. As such, in both networks a number of actors shifted from one role to another as the networks progressed.
These five roles can be combined in single persons, but analysing their network strategies show that actors are often 'specialised' in one of them (without necessarily being appointed to do so, or being perceived as such). The presence and successful combination of these roles contributes to intergovernmental capacity-building, offering better prospect to achieve coordination and overcome governmental fragmentation (Agranoff 2008:11) .
Conclusions
The previous section have shown how network management helps to innovate intergovernmental relations, who is managing to do so, what main attributes they have/require, and that different roles can be discerned. The focus was put strongly on the behavioural activities of individuals in concrete networks. In doing so, the paper might have created a picture of 'network super heroes', a small set of mainly public actors that shape intergovernmental interactions in networks as they see fit. It is however clear that this is not the case, as they have to manage in a rigid, and diffuse institutional landscape, featuring a high number of contingencies.
The potential for network management to innovate IGR is dependent on a wide range of structural or institutional variables, too broad to be dealt with in this paper. helps to achieve informal political and administrative decentralization. The informal political decentralization implies that the IGR-networks take up a policy role without formal powers to do so. The administrative decentralization refers to the fact that IGR-networks join a range of administrations that are expected to incorporate the network operations in their day-to-day praxis.
We used the two-level framework of Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997) to start our analysis, and suggested some important amendments to their approach by putting network management strategies in a more political perspective. In doing so, these strategies get their real, network-bound, and internal meaning and effects. We consider this as a necessity for the study of IGR-networks: management of networks is also about power, coalition building, bargaining, making compromises, playing with concepts and the strategic input of experts.
A main conclusion is that this kind of innovative 'political' behaviour makes up the core of the roles of public officials as managers of the two IGR-networks studied.
This innovation can be developed in the boundary zone between autonomous governments taking part in networks. Put differently: the existence of the grey zone of boundary spanning and boundary scanning stimulates innovation.
Innovation then is related to the features of boundary work: the capacities of and for motivated network managers who can think and act strategically flourish when and where roles are mixed up, where actors develop in a new setting, and when perceptions, goals and strategies of actors meet. It is this mix of institutional and personal features that increases the possibilities to introduce innovation in intergovernmental networks.
